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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) leadership demands a more agile, innovative enterprise 
that can rapidly integrate and deliver leading technologies. In its struggle to keep up with the 
rapid pace of change in both threats and technologies, the DoD is burdened by complex, 
bureaucratic processes, policies, and culture that hinder speed and agility. The disjointed 
budget, requirements, and acquisition domains compound the DoD’s difficulties. Many 
acquisition professionals lack the requisite experience to navigate a disorganized knowledge 
enterprise to develop strategies and execute processes. Congress and DoD executives have 
instituted many initiatives to rapidly acquire and deliver capabilities to the warfighters, but 
these have varying maturity and success.  
The DoD can implement key enablers from the enterprise to the tactical levels to replicate the 
success of government and industry innovations. Schedule should join cost as a top priority 
for a DoD acquisition enterprise that builds upon and integrates many innovative 
organizations and initiatives into its activities. This requires bold leadership to reshape the 
culture and enable top talent to prosper. The DoD should restructure programs and portfolios 
to enable agile and iterative developments, continue partnerships with established industry, 
and engage the services of innovative new firms to maintain technological superiority.  
Strategic Imperative  
Over the last few years, the president, DoD executives, and Congress have sought 
to ensure the DoD is more agile, flexible, and technologically advanced. Better Buying 
Power (BBP) 3.0 initiatives include incentivizing innovation and productivity in government 
and industry, eliminating unproductive bureaucracy, and promoting effective competition. 
These initiatives are designed to counter the threat that adversaries pose to U.S. 
technological superiority.  
The FY16 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes a number of 
provisions to drive speed, agility, and innovation. These include expanding rapid innovation 
programs and rapid acquisition authorities. One section that holds particular promise directs 
the creation of a middle-tier of acquisition to promote rapid prototyping and rapid fielding 
acquisition pathways. These programs rapidly field either prototypes or production units and 
complete fielding within five years. There are provisions for funding R&D and rapid 
prototypes. It empowers senior officials to waive laws and policies that impede certain rapid 
acquisitions. Other types of programs seek to time-box the lengthy requirements process 
and better align the acquisition and budget systems to support speed and agility.  
In March 2016, House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mac 
Thornberry introduced the Acquisition Agility Act to spur the next set of reforms that will 
ensure that the DoD can respond to rapidly changing threats (Thornberry, 2016). It seeks to 
enable the DoD to field better technology faster by restructuring major weapon systems, 
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allowing them to rapidly deliver a minimum acceptable capability, then incrementally develop 
additional components for an open-designed platform.  
Key Challenges/Barriers 
The Defense Acquisition Enterprise is one of the world’s biggest bureaucracies, 
eclipsed only by the full DoD and federal government as a whole. The enormous burdens 
imposed by laws, policies, guides, and memoranda from multiple levels of DoD and Service 
oversight overwhelm programs. All DoD programs follow most of the same processes in the 
acquisition framework, yet each program spends considerable time and energy identifying 
the required processes and how to execute them. These processes force program offices to 
spend far too much time generating paperwork and navigating the bureaucracy rather than 
thinking creatively about program risks, opportunities, and key elements of their strategies.  
Technology Adoption 
While the DoD once led technology R&D, global commercial companies now drive 
innovation (see Figure 1; The White House, 2016). The DoD’s R&D budget has declined by 
over 20% from its peak in 2010, and the defense industry R&D dropped by a third from 1999 
to 2012. Many defense firms followed industry trends of stock buy-backs to obtain short-term 
financial gains, and deferred long-term technology investments. Google, Apple, and 
Microsoft spend five to six times more on R&D than the five largest defense firms combined 
(Center for a New American Security, n.d.). As a result, the defense industry moves too 
slowly to adjust to current technology trends. This has prompted many DoD executives to 
place high priority on reaching out to new industry partners and breaking down the barriers 
that prevent organizations from doing business with the DoD. 
 
 Federal R&D Investments 
In Crossing the Chasm, Geoffrey Moore (1991) describes the vast gap between early 
adopters of a high-technology product and the early majority of the market (Figure 2). 
Drawing on the technology adoption life cycle model and the diffusion of innovations theory, 
Moore outlines the different expectations of each group and proposes strategies for 
mainstream product adoption. 
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 Industry Technology Adoption 
The DoD confronts a similar chasm between the emergence of innovative 
technologies and the integration of those technologies into programs of record (see Figure 
3). DoD labs, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), academia, and industry continue to 
develop exciting new technologies, but the current acquisition system makes it impossible to 
rapidly and effectively leverage them for the warfighter. One challenge centers on identifying 
new technology that could remedy operational shortfalls or enable programs to take 
advantage of opportunities. Furthermore, if a small business demonstrates an operational 
solution, it must often take part in a lengthy competition with no guarantee of eventual 
income and, if selected, be subject to rigorous design, testing, and security protocols 
designed for larger companies. 
 
 DoD Technology Adoption Chasm 
Long development schedules limit the DoD’s ability both to provide new capabilities 
that enable new operational advantages and to retire legacy systems with their increasing 
costs and risks. Over the last five years, the DoD has paid considerable attention to curbing 
this growth. DoDI 5000.02 stresses iterative development as a remedy, yet many major 
systems struggle to implement this approach effectively.  
While major systems often take 10–15 years from concept to fielding (see Figure 4), 
programs only have a 12–18-month window to incorporate new technologies into the design. 
During the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction phase, programs contract with a few 
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companies to develop competitive prototypes. During this phase companies leverage their 
research and development (R&D) programs and bring in partners to identify the leading 
technologies to exploit to maximize system performance. The window closes shortly before 
the Preliminary Design Review (PDR), at which point the key technologies are agreed upon 
in the design. No further opportunity for technology insertion typically occurs until after the 
system achieves Initial Operational Capability (IOC), when the program office may seek to 
upgrade fielded systems or inject improvements via a subsequent increment—which is often 
managed as another acquisition program. 
 
 Technology Insertion Window 
Key Enablers for Innovation and Technology Insertion 
Examining successful government and commercial enterprises, as well as common 
themes in the DoD’s new organizations, initiatives, and legislation enabled identification of 
some key enablers. Every corner of the Pentagon is investing in organizations focused on 
rapid capability deliveries. These are led by forward-thinking risk-takers, supported by an 
innovative culture and subject to only limited bureaucratic constraints. Programs are 
structured effectively from the start to deliver capabilities fast and avoid common acquisition 
pitfalls. They emphasize a renewed partnership with industry, particularly with non-traditional 
high-tech startups. Finally, a focus on delivery, where schedule takes increased priority, 
drives designs and decisions.  
 
 Key Enablers for Innovation and Technology Insertion 
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Technology Incubators 
Incubators and accelerators have proven critical to the development of high-tech 
startup businesses. These programs mentor and train entrepreneurs in technical and 
business skills to help them launch a product and scale their business, secure funding, 
identify partners, hire the right employees, and mature their ideas. Leading incubators 
include IdeaLab, which assists companies to identify technology solutions to big problems 
early in the process. Accelerators such as Y Combinator enable speed to market via a 
defined schedule. Y Combinator alone funded over 1,000 startups with a combined 
valuation of over $65 billion.  
Rapid Acquisition Organizations 
Acquisition executives, policy-makers, and process owners can learn from both 
Silicon Valley and adaptive government organizations how to streamline their processes to 
enable faster deliveries. The DoD has many organizations and initiatives designed to enable 
speed, agility, and technological innovation. In 2012 Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter 
created the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO): 
to help us to re-imagine existing DOD and intelligence community and 
commercial systems by giving them new roles and game-changing 
capabilities to confound potential enemies—the emphasis here was on 
rapidity of fielding, not 10- and 15-year programs. Getting stuff in the field 
quickly. (Carter, 2016) 
The SCO has quickly matured into a major defense organization operating under 
only limited bureaucratic constraints, with an FY16 budget of $460 million for classified 
initiatives. Projects address strategic threats and have achieved early product successes in 
3D-printed micro drones, self-driving boats, and an electromagnetic railgun.  
In other examples, the Pentagon’s Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO) 
executes a series of prototyping and technology demonstration programs to hedge against 
technology risk, accelerate warfare capabilities, and conduct industry outreach to remove 
barriers to commercial technology use. The Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO) 
focuses on urgent classified projects that must deliver results in accelerated timelines. A flat 
organization governed by senior Air Force and DoD officials, the RCO operates with active 
warfighter engagement, small empowered teams, and stable funding. The RCO manages 
the new Long Range Strike Bomber as one of its premier programs. The Chief of Naval 
Operations seeks to replicate this model with a Maritime Accelerated Capabilities Office to 
field mature programs. The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force focuses on delivering emerging 
technologies to deployed operational soldiers. The Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency 
(JIDA) provides COCOMs rapid acquisition and tactical responses to counter improvised 
threats.  
The growth of rapid acquisition organizations gives acquisition executives new 
avenues to meet their top priority and rapid capability demands. However, these 
organizations may also have negative effects on traditional acquisition organizations. The 
DoD’s top talent will flock to the rapid acquisition organizations so that they can work on 
high-priority programs with minimal restrictions and likely achieve greater success. This 
means that traditional program management offices will have less talent and standing to 
meet the demands of lengthy bureaucratic processes, compounding program risks, costs, 
and schedules.  
Instead of instituting new programs and organizations to circumvent the acquisition 
bureaucracy, the DoD could place further emphasis on streamlining and innovation. This 
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would include empowering the acquisition workforce with modern digital tools that effectively 
leverage their collective intelligence in a knowledge-based enterprise. The DoD should also 
hold leaders of functional areas accountable for streamlining their policies and processes, 
and provide the workforce with current guidance, templates, and exemplars on which to 
model their activities. Arming programs with the right structure and strategies from the start 
will improve the likelihood of program success and reduce delays in reviews and 
documentation.  
Leadership and Culture 
As the DoD seeks to promote rapid, agile, and innovative solutions, it must also 
adopt the leadership traits and organizational culture of the successful organizations. 
DARPA, Silicon Valley, and many other government and commercial organizations have 
recognized how to deliver capabilities quickly to respond to changing conditions in the 
market or battlefield.  
Management thought leader Gary Hamel (2016) has identified key features of high-
performing organizations, including  
 Small, autonomous teams empowered to make key decisions 
 Strong sense of competition and collaboration between operating units 
 Significant investment in financial, commercial, and technical skills of 
employees 
 Deeply shared norms and mutual responsibility for unit and enterprise 
success 
 Radically simplified planning and budgeting processes 
According to Hamel, a key driver of the bureaucracy is the continual addition of 
compliance requirements, either by law or policy. Hamel (2016) recommends that 
organizations assess themselves against three key bureaucracy indicators: the number of 
management layers, percentage of employee time spent on compliance, and average 
review timelines. 
The DoD must actively engage program champions, stakeholders, and oversight 
organizations to accelerate decision-making and maintain program momentum. Delegating 
decision authorities to the lowest possible level and maintaining a short chain-of-command 
provides rapid, decentralized decision-making. To balance these delegated authorities, 
portfolio reviews give executives and stakeholders transparency into progress over recent 
months and plans for the next few months. This governance model would enable capability 
deliveries months or years earlier than traditional tiered, serial, gate-check program reviews.  
Successful leaders set a bold vision, concrete goals, and incentives for successful 
capability deliveries against an aggressive schedule. They provide simple strategies, free of 
bureaucratic jargon, incorporating key stakeholder interests. For instance, Boeing’s goals for 
the 727 aircraft design were that the plane must be able to hold 131 passengers, fly nonstop 
from Miami to New York City, and land on La Guardia runway 4-22 (a short runway). 
Stakeholders who can clearly articulate the strategy and their role can focus on achieving 
the desired outcomes. The tight integration of end users and developers enables regular 
collaboration on operational concepts and development details. This ensures a common 
understanding of operational requirements and potential technical solutions. While program 
managers and contracting officers provide official direction to contractors, facilitating user–
developer collaboration has proven critical to satisfying users. Acquirers and developers 
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who know specific users by name will have greater impetus to delivering a high-quality 
system than those who treat users as some abstract, faceless group.  
A few DoD organizations embody the traits necessary to overcome the bureaucracy 
and delight users with groundbreaking innovations. Two organizations with a long track 
record of success can serve as models for others to replicate.  
DARPA has a 50-year history of radical innovation spanning the Internet, satellites, 
stealth, and unmanned vehicles. DARPA’s model includes 100 temporary technical program 
managers and a mix of high-performing individuals and teams from across government, 
industry, and academic research centers. Its projects are challenging, focused, and finite, 
making them attractive to high-caliber talent (Dugan & Gabriel, 2013). DARPA focuses on 
“use-inspired, basic research” that balances visionary, exploratory, basic research with 
practical applied research. Project leaders have the authority to reallocate resources, 
change strategies, and move talent on or off the project as needed, and focus on iterative 
progress rather than detailed upfront planning. DARPA’s flat structure ensures that leaders 
rapidly become aware of issues and address them.  
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) values speed over all other factors when it 
comes to acquisition (Guerts, 2016). SOCOM collaborates closely with many other 
organizations to “work at the speed of SOF” [Special Operations Forces] and ensure 
efficient and effective acquisitions in its dynamic, complex environment. SOCOM opened its 
own technology incubator, SofWerX, housing it in a 10,000 square-foot open floor building 
with the look and feel of a tech startup (Erwin, 2016). SOCOM involves innovative firms in 
frequent engagements, demonstrations, and hackathons.  
The culture of the program office also plays a critical role in achieving speed and 
agility. Many program offices have staff who have applied the same methods for the last 30 
years. These are not the innovators the DoD needs. Program managers need acquisition 
professionals with enough experience to understand the key elements of their function, yet 
are deeply committed to pursuing new business models. Moreover, a modern workplace 
environment and suite of collaboration tools would help programs to recruit and retain top 
talent.  
Contracting Officers (COs) must function as strategic partners tightly integrated into 
the program office, rather than operate as a separate organization that simply processes the 
contract paperwork. COs cannot treat every contract as an 18–24 month procurement 
process, but instead must seek to understand the program objectives and design contract 
solutions. In 2016 the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) launched the Digital IT 
Acquisition Professional (DITAP) Training and Development Program for COs to ensure that 
the DoD has a cadre of high-performing professionals to acquire leading IT capabilities in 
the Digital Age, and directed agencies to form Acquisition Innovation Labs to foster a culture 
of innovation (Rung, 2016).  
The different acquisition phases require different types of leaders. The early phases 
call for visionary innovators who can explore the full opportunity space and engage in 
intuitive decision-making. The development and production phases demand a more 
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pragmatic orchestrator to execute the designs and strategies via collaboration and 
consensus decisions.1 
Program Structure 
A BBP 3.0 initiative centers on aggressively reducing cycle time by targeting the root 
causes of schedule delays (Kendall, 2015). The Defense Acquisition Enterprise should 
promulgate—and act on—the Silicon Valley mantra “Always Be Shipping.” Silicon Valley 
often focuses on getting a Minimum Viable Product (MVP) in the hand of users quickly, then 
iterate based on active feedback and system performance. The MVP mindset requires some 
culture and policy changes in Pentagon operations across requirements, budgets, and 
acquisition domains. A major weapon system that delivers all of its planned capabilities after 
10–15 years will not satisfy its customers as much as a system that delivers 60% of its 
capabilities in 6–8 years, with the program office then involving the customer in iterative 
deliveries every few years thereafter. This principle holds true for acquisitions from small 
software programs to the F-22 fighter.  
Good program managers know their schedule’s critical path and focus sharply on 
reducing barriers. Sufficient, but not excessive, upfront analysis of requirements, 
technologies, costs, risks, and alternatives will enable program managers and stakeholders 
to effectively scope the program. These insights will help structure a program to deliver an 
MVP as soon as possible, while allowing iterative development over the long term. This 
balance of speed and rigor will ensure that warfighters obtain useful capabilities faster. 
Programs should embrace constraints by first adopting fixed schedules, mature 
technologies, and open architectures that drive design, and then relying on iteration to keep 
pace with technology advances. Follow-on increments then enable programs to integrate 
technologies that have since matured to address emerging requirements based on current 
operations and feedback on previous deliveries. Continual investment in research and 
analysis enables many government and industry partners to iteratively mature new 
technologies for a mission area. 
The HASC Acquisition Agility Act seeks to drive Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs) to this structure and requires use of open design principles. It proposes that 
warfighters assign targets for costs and fielding dates and that Milestone Decision 
Authorities manage programs to these targets. The act differentiates between platforms and 
their components: Platforms are the major systems and involve slower development, 
whereas components are structured to be easily and quickly upgraded as technology 
develops to deliver improvements without waiting for a new system to be approved.  
At present, the DoD continues to manage acquisition programs as large, stand-alone 
systems driven by independent budgets, requirements, and program offices, yet DoD 
executives and operational commanders seek integrated suites of capabilities. The DoD can 
enable speed and agility by restructuring, integrating, and managing related programs as 
acquisition portfolios. The major schedule drivers include securing a budget, defining 
requirements, program documentation, and awarding a contract. A portfolio structure 
manages these elements at a capstone level, enabling smaller programs to navigate the 
acquisition life cycle faster. A portfolio strategy, architecture, and roadmap can shape the 
                                            
 
 
1 These leadership traits were derived from Geoffrey Moore’s concepts in Escape Velocity. 
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continual development and integration of a suite of smaller programs. Dynamic allocation of 
funds and talent to priority projects optimizes the portfolio performance and achieves a 
balanced force mix of large, medium, and small systems.  
Agile is the leading software development methodology in industry, with growing 
adoption across the DoD and the federal government. It empowers small, high-performing 
teams to focus on demonstrating and delivering software rather than on coordinating dozens 
of documents that must be sent up the chain for approval each step of the way. A tailored 
version of Agile’s guiding principles for the DoD includes the following: 
 Small, frequent releases iteratively and incrementally developed 
 Reviews of working software instead of extensive documentation 
 Rapid response to changes in operations, technologies, and budgets 
 Active user involvement to ensure high operational value 
While Agile practices are best suited for IT programs, many of them apply to all 
programs, especially as software plays an increasing role in system performance. Programs 
have tailored their structure and processes to enable Agile adoption and experienced some 
early success. The resulting software is often of higher quality and more responsive to 
users’ priority needs. Successful implementation of Agile requires a different culture and set 
of rigorous processes than the traditional acquisition environment.  
Partnerships With Industry 
In previewing the FY17 defense budget Secretary of Defense Carter (2016) said, 
"One of my core goals in this job has been to build and to rebuild bridges between [DoD] 
and the innovative, strong American technology and industry community.” LinkedIn has 
provided him with ideas on how to overhaul the outmoded DoD personnel system and 
innovate for the force of the future. Secretary Carter has named Eric Schmidt, Chairman of 
Google parent company Alphabet, to head the Defense Innovation Advisory Board, which 
will “address future organizational and cultural challenges, including the use of technology 
alternatives, streamlined project management processes and approaches—all with the goal 
of identifying quick solutions to DoD problems” (Defense Media Activity, 2016). The Air 
Force seeks to harness IBM’s Watson’s computing power to tackle the “morass of the 
federal procurement process.” 
The DoD has established the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) as an 
initiative to foster increased communication, knowledge, and access to high-tech startup 
companies in Silicon Valley and Boston. DIUx seeks to build and strengthen relationships 
and play matchmaker between emerging technologies and operational challenges. By 
developing outposts where the entrepreneurs operate, the DoD can reach new companies 
outside the Capital Beltway.  
As an example of an innovation partnership, Airbus partnered with micro-
manufacturing innovator Local Motors to co-create commercial drones using the Airbus 
Quadcruiser’s hybrid concept as the starting design. Local Motors recently released its Strati 
roadster, the world’s first 3D-printed car. Airbus sought to “speed-up development and 
manufacturing in aerospace through an open competition based on co-creation and micro-
manufacturing.” The concept integrates the design of fixed-wing aircraft and quad-copters 
by combining the business models of a leading commercial firm with a new, distributed 
network of innovators.  
While the DoD continues to engage startups to identify innovative technology 
solutions, integrating them into major weapon systems programs still requires active 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 147 - 
participation by traditional defense prime contractors. The large defense contractors argue 
they have robust networks to identify innovative small businesses with promising solutions 
and involve them as subcontractors; alternatively, they acquire the technology or company. 
DoD executives want to use their buying power and operating environment to expand the 
identification of new technologies and the ability to link those technologies to military 
applications.  
Deliveries Are the Ultimate Measure 
The DoD’s annual reports to Congress should highlight the military capabilities—
aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, space, and cyberspace assets—delivered to warfighters 
over the past year. At proper levels of classification, the reports should also include a 
summary of the operational impact of these new systems (with proper classifications) to give 
operational commands, Congress, and taxpayers a clear understanding of the value these 
systems provide to their end users relative to the $300 billion per year cost.  
The DoD and Government Accountability Office (GAO) already publish the total and 
unit cost of each major weapon system. Tremendous visibility and incentives would result if 
the scheduled IOC and Full Operational Capability (FOC) dates for each system were also 
published and featured prominently on a DoD website. Seeing how many months and years 
elapse between the program’s start—often with the Materiel Development Decision (MDD)—
and IOC and FOC would shock many. Supporting tables for program sponsors and 
acquisition executives could compare the schedule length against their original estimates to 
identify and monitor schedule drivers and delays.  
The MC-12W Liberty Aircraft represents a recent rapid acquisition success story. To 
address an urgent demand for information, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR), the Air 
Force’s Big Safari program rapidly integrated existing sensors and communication datalinks 
on a commercial aircraft. It delivered Liberty to the theater in less than eight months from 
funding approval, at a low unit cost of $17 million. Liberty provided a balanced force mix to 
complement high-end systems such as Joint STARS and Global Hawk. The aircraft flew 
over 300,000 combat flight hours in Afghanistan and is credited with 73% of all Air Force 
ISR sorties and the kill/capture of hundreds of high-value individuals in Afghanistan during 
2012.  
Summary 
The DoD’s massive size constitutes both its competitive advantage and greatest risk. 
For the DoD to ensure that U.S. forces remain the premier military in the 21st century, 
programs must constantly innovate by rapidly incorporating leading technologies. The DoD 
must remain strategically agile, responding to new threats and opportunities across new 
domains. Secretary Carter, Under Secretary Frank Kendall, and Congress have pioneered 
many initiatives on innovation and rapid technology insertion. Each Service and Agency has 
embarked on related initiatives and set up relevant organizations. Some will require a few 
years to take root and grow into regular operations.  
To succeed, these efforts require committed leadership, but innovation rarely occurs 
as the result of a top-down, central planning initiative. Instead, achieving the desired results 
requires a robust ecosystem of technologists, acquirers, and users with environments to 
model, demonstrate, and test prototypes and solutions. This network of experts across 
government, FFRDCs, academia, and industry should regularly collaborate online and in 
person.  
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DoD leaders need to empower junior officers and civilians to explore new ideas 
about both technology and business practices. They should assign a team to relentlessly 
examine every aspect of the acquisition enterprise and expose bureaucratic policies, 
processes, and barriers that hinder speed and agility. The DoD must also review the current 
acquisition workforce and identify the outstanding performers to recruit and retain. Then, 
DoD should partner young, motivated technology enthusiasts with experienced acquisition 
professionals to mentor each other and tackle challenges. Programs should regularly 
recognize and promote staff who take risks, embrace new partnerships, and deliver new 
capabilities to warfighters sooner.  
The DoD should structure its programs to apply proven processes for managing 
schedule-consuming requirements, contracting, and budgets so that they can navigate the 
acquisition life cycle faster. Systems leveraging open architectures and incremental designs 
can focus on delivering initial capability quickly, and then iterate improvements over time. 
The DoD can tailor acquisition processes for each major type of system to streamline each 
program’s path through focused guidance. Partnerships with industry—both traditional 
defense contractors and startups—will allow the DoD to benefit from their research, 
technological innovations, and business practices.  
DoD executives have laid the groundwork by creating many new organizations and 
initiatives. As a result, acquisition professionals now have many avenues for pursuing 
innovative solutions and the leadership support to do so. It will be up to the leaders who join 
DoD under the next administration to build on their efforts to enable a nimbler acquisition 
process that meets the needs of a dominant military.  
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